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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHEILA REESE,

REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 960749CA
Priority No. 14B

THOMAS E. REESE,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff or "wife") submits the following as
her reply brief in the above matter:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

This Court should reverse the ruling regarding the amount and duration of

child support. Specifically:
a.

This Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in

imputing income to the wife, when she had no prior history of working full-time
and when there was no evidence of full-time employment available to her, nor of
what her hourly wage would be if she were to work full-time. This Court should

either base child support upon plaintiff's actual earned income from employment
of $586 00 per month, and her net rental income of $776 00 per month, for a
total monthly income of $1,362 00, or
b

This Court should order that only minimum wage may be imputed

to plaintiff (of about $732 00 per month at the time of trial), and her net rental
income, to arrive at a gross monthly income for purposes of calculating child
support of $1,507 00, and
c

This Court should mandate entry of an order that plaintiff be

awarded one-half her reasonable and necessary work-related day care
expenses incurred for the child, as additional support, and
d

This Court should order that child support commence effective with

the date of separation of the parties, which occurred about April 1, 1992, some
four years prior to the date of trial (Of course, defendant should oe awarded
credit for any child support he actually paid to plaintiff during the pendency of
the action), and
e

An order to withhold and deliver should issue from the trial court to

guarantee payment of defendant's child support obligation
2

This Court should reverse and remand to the trial court for entry of an

award of alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $800 00 per month This should be based

2

upon the defendant's income, which was found by the trial court to be $3,592.00 per
month, against expenses of $2,209.00 per month, and should be based upon the
plaintiff's income of $1,362.00 per month, or her imputed income, based upon minimum
wage, of $1,507.00 per month, and her expenses of $1,436.00 per month, plus $388.00
for health insurance, $205.00 for the mortgage necessary to pay defendant, and
reasonable sums necessary to enable her to obtain a new car, and afford
extracurricular activities for this child. This alimony award would equalize the incomes
and circumstances of the party's households.
3.

This Court should award plaintiff all interest in the Herbert Avenue

property, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, as plaintiff's sole and separate
non-marital property, acquired by an advance on her inheritance. This Court should
specifically find that it was an abuse of discretion to determine that the defendant had
participated in enhancing or preserving the value of the Herbert Avenue property such
that he had obtained an equitable interest in the property. This Court should further
find that the terms and conditions of the "agreement" of the parties pertaining to Herbert
Avenue are void and unenforceable as a violation of the probate code, as against
public policy, and/or by reason of a failure of consideration.
4.

This Court should award plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees incurred

at trial, based upon the income disparity of the parties, and this Court should also
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award plaintiff her court costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal.

ARGUMENT

POINT 1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING
THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF CHILD
SUPPORT.

This court below erred in its calculation of the amount of child support, and in the
duration of that child support. Specifically, the court erred in making these calculations
by imputing income to plaintiff, and/or by failing to impute income to defendant. The
court further erred by failing to award plaintiff day care for the minor child as additional
child support, and by failing to enter an order to withhold and deliver. The trial court
also erred in failing to commence child support effective with the date of the parties'
separation, on or about April 1, 1992. (The date of separation is established in R.O.A.,
207.)

A.

The District Court Improperly Imputed Income to
Plaintiff.

As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, Utah Code Ann.. §78-45-7.5(7)(b), provides
that a district court may impute income in calculating child support based upon a
finding of voluntary underemployment, but that such imputation of income must be
4

"based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar background in
the community." The defendant, though he argued at trial to impute income to the
plaintiff, utterly failed to produce any evidence at trial regarding a full-time work history
for the plaintiff (because there was none), regarding the plaintiff's qualifications to
obtain full-time employment, or to receive income in excess of minimum wage, and he
utterly failed to provide evidence of income for persons of similar background in the
community working full-time.
Defendant argues in his brief to this Court that plaintiff "clearly acknowledged"
at trial that she was voluntarily underemployed, and that there is no better indication of
plaintiff's employment potential and probable earnings than her part-time salary.
The defendant's reliance upon the holding in Hall v. HallT 858 P.2d 1018 (Ut.
App., 1993), is misplaced. The Hall decision deals with the question of a drop in
earnings, upon which a child support award is proposed to be based. It does not deal
with the plaintiff's circumstances here. The plaintiff has suffered no "drop" in her
income. As clearly acknowledged by her former husband in his own testimony at trial,
he had never worked outside the parties' home on a full-time basis during the marriage,
because she had remained at home and been primarily a homemaker and a mother.
(R.O.A. 34, Tr. 117). By defendant's own admission, plaintiff's income had actually

5

increased since the separation, if it had moved at all, because plaintiff did not have any
full-time work history. Thus, her employment at trial was not "underemployment" based
upon her history. Rather, it demonstrated an effort on her part to juggle the needs of
the parties' child for supervision, with the child's needs for economic support.
Defendant's claim that the plaintiff's part-time employment history demonstrates
that she can obtain full-time employment at $8.00 per hour is disingenuous. There is a
vast difference between hiring somebody on a part-time basis, to work for a few hours,
without guarantee of full-time hours and without benefits. It is absolutely logical to
assume that, whereas an employee might be able to obtain a few hours at a higher
wage, she would not be considered such a valuable employee if she were taken on a
full-time basis, and paid a full-time salary plus benefits. The trial court's arbitrary
decision that plaintiff could obtain an $8.00 per hour job, simply because she had a few
hours per week at $8.00 per hour, is unsupported by any evidence. The defendant's
similar assumption in his brief is also unsupported by any evidence. Wife's work
history is part-time only. Her qualifications are a high school diploma and part-time
experience. There was no evidence at all of what persons of similar background are
paid for full-time work in this community.
By statute, the trial court should, at most, have imputed the federal minimum
wage to plaintiff, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-45-7.5(7)(c). As correctly noted by
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defendant in his brief, this imputation must be made if there is "no recent work history"
and no evidentiary basis for imputing a higher wage. As has already been established,
there is no evidentiary basis for imputing any particular wage whatsoever for full-time
employment. Moreover, the defendant urges too restrictive an interpretation of §78-457.5(7)(c). The imputation of minimum wage should apply whenever there is no recent
work history of the kind sought to be imputed by the trial court. In this particular case,
the plaintiff has no recent work history for full-time employment, and indeed, during
almost twelve years of her history which are in evidence, she had never worked fulltime. Because there was no history of what she could earn full-time (if she could even
obtain full-time employment at all), the court below should have imputed minimum
wage.
Plaintiff also falls within two exceptions to the imputation of income, namely the
costs of child case exception and the unusual emotional needs of the child exception,
as provided in Utah Code Ann.T §78-45-7.5(7)(d). Defendant improperly argues in his
brief that this Court must find the costs of child care actually exceed the amount plaintiff
would earn if she "cured her underemployment." This is not what the statute requires.
The statute requires merely that the costs of after-school care for this child would
"approach" the income to be earned by any additional employment. It is undisputed,
based upon the record at trial, that, if plaintiff were employed full-time, she would have
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to have after-school care for the parties' daughter. (R.O.A. 195). Defendant suggests
in his brief that, because the parties' daughter was "nearly ten-years-old" at the time of
trial, she could do without after-school supervision. Plaintiff submits to this Court that,
if plaintiff were to leave a nine-year-old child unsupervised routinely after school, for
hours at a time, she would be guilty of abuse and neglect of that child, the defendant's
cavalier attitude about the child's need for supervision not withstanding.
On the basis of this record, adequate evidence exists that the costs of day care for
the child approach any additional net income the plaintiff might receive by reason of fulltime employment.
Plaintiffs child also has special emotional needs. The defendant stipulated that he
would have supervised visitation with the parties' child. He also testified at trial that he
had settled a sexual misconduct lawsuit with a third-party plaintiff involving his sexual
misbehavior in the past. It ought to be abundantly clear that defendant would not have
stipulated to this restriction on his visitation with his child, absent some specific reason he
would constitute a danger to his own child if he were left alone with her. This fact alone,
and the fact that the plaintiff cannot rely upon the defendant to give her a break from childrearing obligations (as most custodial parents are able to do) indicates that this child has
special needs and the family has special circumstances which mandate that the mother
not be required to work full-time. Rather, she should be permitted to be home after school
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with the child, and to supervise the child, as she has done for the first nine or ten years of
the child's life.

B.

If Income Is Imputed To Plaintiff, It Should Also Be
Imputed To Defendant Upon The Same Formula.

Defendant argues in his brief that it is entirely appropriate that the Court assume
plaintiff is capable of working 40 hours per week, 12 months per year, at $8.00 per hour,
if she has been able to find any part-time employment at that pay rate.
If these kinds of assumptions are appropriate about plaintiff's income, then they
should be made about the defendant's income as well. Defendant works full-time, about
40 hours per week, during about nine or ten months of the year. He is paid monthly
throughout the year for his work, but he has over two months off from mid-June through
late August when he need not report for work with the school district. During this time,
defendant could obtain temporary work of some nature. It is just as logical to assume he
could find a temporary job for two or two and one-half months of the year at his current
salary, as it is to assume that the plaintiff can obtain full-time employment for the same
$8.00 per hour the school district is willing to pay her for part-time employment. If the trial
court reached one conclusion, this Court should, in fairness and equity, reach the other.
Defendant's income should be deemed increased by at least one-sixth, and this increased
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income should be used to calculate his child support and alimony obligations.
Defendant's explanation for why he should not be required to be employed from
June through August of each year is that, while he is not working as a school teacher, he
maintains his "rental property." It is critical to note that the defendant's only rental property
is Belair Drive which he owns jointly in connection with a third party. This third party, who
also owns one-half interest in this property, clearly has an equal obligation with defendant
to repair and maintain this property. It begs credulity to suggest that it requires one man's
full-time labor for five months of the year to perform necessary routine maintenance of a
single residential building containing three residential units. Yet, this is the impact of what
defendant claims. Essentially, defendant is saying that he needs two and one-half months
off each year to do his one-half the repair work. What he really is asking is to take the
summer each year to work on odd jobs around his house, which the majority of the
employed population manage to get don on weekends and week nights, while also
maintaining full-time employment.
It is also critical to note that, if defendant needs over two months per year, full-time,
to maintain his rental property/residence, the defendant is entitled to the same
consideration in assessing her income. Plaintiff, also, is a landlord of rental property.
Plaintiff has her own residence to care for, and a free-standing rental duplex on Scott
Circle. The trial court felt free to assume that plaintiff could do everything necessary to
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manage and maintain her rental property at Scott Circle while working full-time twelve
months per year. The trial court certainly imputed income to plaintiff on this basis. If
plaintiff is required to work full-time and to keep up her rental property simultaneously, then
the same should, in fairness, apply to the defendant
Defendant cannot simultaneously argue that full-time employment should be
imputed to plaintiff on the one hand, and argue that he should not also be required to work
during summers.

C.

The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Commence Child
Support Effective April 1, 1992.

As set forth in plaintiff's opening brief, the child of these parties was entitled to
support from both parents, as a matter of law, during her entire life. It is undisputed these
parties separated immediately prior to April 1, 1992, and the child has lived with her
mother, during all of the time since the separation.
Retroactive support is necessary to make up for child support shortages which
occurred during the parties' separation. Defendant asserts that there is no evidence of
any such "shortage." If, in fact, the defendant actually paid plaintiff during the separation
what he ultimately is ordered to pay by this Court, then he will have no need to fear such
an order, because he has already paid his obligation. Since he resists so strenuously the
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retroactive application of child support, it is obvious that he did not make payments in an
amount mandated by law.
In his is brief, the defendant objects to an award of retroactive child support
because it is "not provided for by the Utah Code." (Defendant's brief at page 17).
First, it should be noted that retroactive child support is not expressly prohibited by the
Utah CodeT either. Further, everything from the Utah State Legislature set forth in the
Utah Code provides that minor children are entitled to child support for all of their lives,
while they are minors, and not just for some of that time.
Most importantly, the Utah Code does provide for retroactive child support at
Utah Code Ann.. §78-45a-3, which allows child support to be awarded retroactively for
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action for support. This
specific section of the Utah Code does not limit its applicability to one kind of child
support action or another, though that entire section of the Code is the Uniform Act on
Paternity.
As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, to award retroactive support to an
illegitimate child, while depriving legitimate children of the same rights, would constitute
a gross violation of a child's right to equal protection, as guaranteed by both the State
and Federal Constitutions. Moreover, this equal protection issue would have to be
reviewed with great scrutiny, because the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child may be
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considered a suspect classification. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). Defendant
utterly fails to address this entire equal protection concern which arises if Utah Code
Ann., §78-45a-3, is found not to apply to benefit legitimate children.
Finally, defendant's argument that plaintiff did not suffer support "shortages" is
disingenuous. By his own testimony, he paid plaintiff a mere $100.00 per month during
the first year of their separation, and $150.00 per month less the telephone bill (for a
grand total of $150.00 per month) during the next three years of the separation. (See
defendant's brief at page 18.) Since, even failing to impute full-time income to
defendant, and imputing full-time income to plaintiff, the defendant's child support
award was more than double $150.00 per month, it is clear that the child has suffered a
tremendous shortfall in her support. She is entitled to recover this shortfall.
Defendant makes much of the fact that, over this four-year period, defendant
was able to make ends meet, and to "save money." First it should be noted that the
money was saved solely to replace plaintiff's 1965 car with a 1986 car for $2,400.00,
and to pay the property taxes on plaintiff's two parcels of real property. (Tr. pp. 31,
27.38 and 39). She had, as of trial, been unable to save any more than those amounts.
It would be grossly unfair to the child to penalize her, just because her mother
happened to be frugal, and to make ends meet under difficult circumstances.
Further, support is never intended to keep children at a mere subsistence level.
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It is intended to keep children, as much as possible, at the same standard of living they
would have enjoyed, had their parents never divorced.
Finally, defendant's own brief acknowledges that the trial court had discretion, at
least, to award support retroactive to April 1, 1992, if the judge chose to do so.
However, there are absolutely no findings in the record to demonstrate how the court
below decided to exercise this discretion, in failing to award any back support to a
nine-year-old girl who had received inadequate support for four years. At the very
least, the trial court was obligated to make such specific findings about how it was
exercising its discretion. It does not suffice merely to say that the plaintiff may have
had other options to collect this child support, and that, therefore, she is precluded from
doing so in the final decree of divorce. The trial court should be compelled to make
specific findings regarding the support, including the financial circumstances of the
parties and the needs and interests of the child.

D.

The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Award Plaintiff
Her Day Care Expenses And An Order To
Withhold And Deliver.

It is absolutely undisputed that Utah law mandates a custodial parent be
awarded one-half her work-related day care expenses as additional child support. Utah
Code Ann.T §78-45-7.16. The failure of the trial court to give this to plaintiff was error
14

by any standard of review.
The plaintiff was also entitled to receive an order to withhold and deliver, which
is required under Utah law. Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5.1. The trial court failed to do so,
based upon defendant's timely payment of child support. The court found that the
defendant had been "timely" paying child support when he had been paying a mere
$150.00 per month against a $372.00 real monthly support obligation. Since this
"timely" payment of support was the lower court's only basis for failing to grant plaintiff
an order to withhold support, it was error, by any standard of review, for the court to fail
to do so.
It does not cure this last defect in the order to suggest that, if defendant were
ever to fall behind in his ongoing support, the district court could provide an order for
automatic withholding at that time. Such a remedy would put plaintiff to the expense of
further litigation, an expense which she should not be required to bear.

POINT 2.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY.

As noted in the argument pertaining to child support, the plaintiff's earned
income is, in reality, $586.00 per month. If the Court imputes income, it should be
imputed at minimum wage of $730.00 per month. In addition, she has net rental
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income of $776.00 per month.
Also, as noted in the opening brief, defendant was found to have earned income
of $3,409.00 per month, plus rental income of $183.00. This income should be
increased by an imputed one-sixth of his earned income, or $568.28. because he is
capable of obtaining employment during at least two summer months.
Defendant's expenses were found by the trial court to be $2,209.00, per month.
(Finding of Fact, number 6). Plaintiff's expenses were found to be $1,436.00 per
month. (Findings of Fact, number 6). This figure failed to take into account her need to
purchase her own health insurance, her need to replace an eleven-year-old vehicle,
her need to devise some means to pay defendant his lien for the Herbert Avenue
property, and a reasonable request on her part that she have money in her budget to
pay for extracurricular activities of the parties' child.
When all of these factors constituting the financial conditions and needs of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff's ability to produce income for herself, and the defendant's ability
to provide support, it is clear the court below abused its discretion in failing to give
plaintiff alimony. Plaintiff is left without money to meet her necessary expenses, while
defendant enjoys a windfall every month of disposable cash which is not allocated for
any necessity in his budget.
Defendant argues that plaintiff has mischaracterized this marriage as a "lengthy"
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one of over eleven years. In fact, the parties were married for over eleven years from
the date of their marriage to the date of the divorce trial. If defendant wished to change
this circumstance earlier, he was free to file a complaint for divorce. This Court has
previously held a five-year marriage to be so long-term as to require permanent
alimony. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Ut. App., 1992).
In his brief, defendant mischaracterizes the facts by claiming that the plaintiff
had "worked during the entire course of the parties' marriage." (See defendant's brief
at page 20.) In fact, defendant himself testified at trial that the plaintiff had been
primarily a homemaker and a mother during the entire marriage.
Defendant mischaracterizes the fact that plaintiff was able to remodel the duplex
on Scott Circle and acquire the interest in Herbert Avenue, free and clear of any
mortgage. In fact, the remodeling of the Scott Circle duplex was accomplished by a
loan against the property, paid for by the rental income. The Herbert was an advance
on plaintiff's inheritance. She did not "earn" either of these assets. They were handed
to her as a gift, or by the fortunate circumstance of rising real estate values and rising
rents in the Wasatch Front area during the relevant time period.
Defendant mischaracterizes the facts by alleging that plaintiff has no long-term
debt. According to the trial court's order, she owes the defendant $26,000.00, and has
not one dime of cash resources to pay this debt. She must sell the minor child's
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residence or encumber it, or sell her rental property or encumber it, in order to meet
this obligation, thus drastically altering the rosy picture of her finances painted by the
defendant. She has an eleven-year-old car purchased for $2,400.00 in 1994. The car
cannot last long and must be replaced. Since she has no savings except to pay
property taxes, a newer car will have to be financed. Most importantly, plaintiff has
been able to do all this only by taking in a roommate, an indignity a grown woman with
a child should not be forced to stoop to. (Tr. pp.36 and 37).
Defendant disputes the claim that plaintiff is uninsurable, and, alleges without
evidence that plaintiff will easily be able to obtain health insurance if she just gets a
full-time job. This ignores her previous breast cancer diagnosis and treatment, which is
well established in the record. It ignores the fact that not all insurance carriers are
willing to take on a person with a previous cancer diagnosis, and not all insured groups
avoid a check for pre-existing disqualifying conditions. Her own testimony at trial was
that she was uninsurable, and could only obtain health insurance through the H.I.P.
program of the State of Utah, designed to accommodate people who are otherwise
uninsurable, at a monthly premium of $388.00. (Tr. pp.33-34).
There was a clear abuse of discretion in the failure to award plaintiff alimony.
The failure to award her alimony goes against all established principles of law as set
forth by this Court regarding awards of alimony. (See Watson, supra.).
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POINT 3.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN THE
HERBERT AVENUE PROPERTY.

Defendant argues in his brief that the Herbert Avenue property was granted by
plaintiff to defendant eight years before trial by the quit-claim deed and the
"agreement." As plaintiff has argued in her opening brief, the "agreement" of the
parties is against public policy, is unenforceable, because of a failure of the defendant
to perform his consideration, and violates the Utah Probate Code.
Defendant relies upon the quit-claim deed to support his claim for 25% interest
Herbert Avenue. His analysis would be applicable if this were not an equitable divorce
proceeding. However, in actions involving divorce, the actual title of the property is not
the determining factor.
Defendant mischaracterizes the plaintiff's argument as an attack on the
sufficiency of the consideration. Plaintiff has not attacked the underlying consideration
for the agreement, but rather alleges that the defendant failed to perform the
consideration, thus making the "agreement" unenforceable by him. Within the four
corners of that "agreement," he promised to paint the house. He failed to do so. Within
the "agreement," he promised to support the parties' family, including plaintiff's children
from a prior marriage, so that plaintiff could save her child support. He failed to do so.
Defendant attempts to address the fact that the child support provision of the
19

"agreement" is void as against public policy, by pointing out that the district court did
not bother to follow the "agreement" regarding child support in any event, so that this
void portion of the document does not matter. This analysis is incongruous. Defendant
is apparently conceding that the child support provisions are against public policy,
because they violate the Utah uniform child support guidelines. The same is true of
those provisions purporting to convey property upon death, without complying with the
Utah Probate Code. Defendant's argument is apparently that the portions which violate
the Probate Code can be excised, the portions regarding child support can be excised,
but that the defendant can still enforce the sole remaining provision, which is
conveyance of a 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property to him. Where so much
of the "agreement" is void or unenforceable, the remaining portions should not be
carried into effect.
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POINT 4.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COURT
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN
THIS ACTION.

Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees, as testified at
trial, in the sum of $5,450.00. Further, plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and
attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the
Court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should be reversed and the
case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a specific order. This Court
need not remand the matter for new findings, because the Court has adequate
evidence before it to find that the trial court's order should be reversed and that a
specific new order should issue. Specifically:
a.

This Court should remand the case for entry of an order awarding

the plaintiff/custodial parent adequate child support. Her child support should be
calculated upon the basis of her actual income ($586.00 per month), or imputed
minimum wage ($730.00 per month), as this Court may deem appropriate,
together with her net rental income, and on the basis of the defendant's actual
income of $3,592.00 per month, or upon his imputed income totaling $4,160.28,
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as this Court may deem proper. Further, this support obligation should
commence effective with the parties' separation, four years prior to the date of
trial, or April 1, 1992; and
b.

This Court should award plaintiff a specific sum of alimony of

$800.00 per month, commencing effective with the date of trial in June 1996, and
continuing for eleven and one-half years, or until the death of the plaintiff, the
death of the defendant, or the plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever
should occur first; and
c.

This Court should reverse the ruling regarding Herbert Avenue,

and should award all interest in the Herbert Avenue property to the plaintiff, free
and clear of any interest of the defendant, as plaintiff's sole and separate nonmarital property. In the alternative, the sum due and payable by plaintiff to
defendant should be made non-interest bearing and payable upon standard
contingencies, namely, the death of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's remarriage or
cohabitation in the home with a man other than the defendant, plaintiff selling the
home at her own election, plaintiff ceasing to use the home as her primary place
of residence and/or the primary place of residence of the minor child, or the
minor child achieving the age of eighteen years and graduating from high
school; and
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d.

Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees

incurred in trial of $5,450.00, as testified to at trial (R.O.A., 341); and
e.

Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees

incurred in this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1997.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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